Why Did Nationalism Prove Such an Unstoppable Force Under Gorbachev Essay Example

Why Did Nationalism Prove Such an Unstoppable Force Under Gorbachev Essay Example Why Did Nationalism Prove Such an Unstoppable Force Under Gorbachev Essay Why Did Nationalism Prove Such an Unstoppable Force Under Gorbachev Essay Under Gorbachev nationalism proved an unstoppable force that precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nationalism had always existed across the Union but it was allowed to surface and become a problem under Gorbachev predominantly because of his tactical mistakes and because of his reform programme. Nationalism became an unstoppable force because of the deprivation in many Soviet republics. The economic reforms of perestroika were designed to rejuvenate the weak Soviet economy and put it on par with western economies. However, McCauley wrote that economically, perestroika was an abject failure resulting in economic decline, shortages, large budget deficits and rising inflation (1998, 265). By 1990 the economy was in such a poor state that many people in the republics argued that greater autonomy or independence was necessary to protect their economies from collapsing (Walker, 1993, 182). Economic reforms continually failed to give the republics either ownership or managerial control over natural resources or fixed assets on their territory. Yeltsin, who was a popular nationalist campaigner, often complained that even Russia owned just fifteen percent of its resources in 1990 because they were largely controlled by the Soviet Union (Walker, 1993, 178). As perestroika developed, there was a growing belief that the only way to reform the economy was to move away from the centrally planned economy and rely more on market mechanisms. These reforms seriously damaged the Soviet Union because it was taken for granted that state property was the bedrock of a socialist system (McCauley, 1992, 91). The CPSU was legitimised by the fact it was leading the Soviet Union forward to socialism but the economic reforms were clearly not socialist. The existence of the Soviet Union relied on the legitimacy of the CPSU, which was now rendered illegitimate by economic reforms. McCauley wrote, the CPSU was the institution which provided the glue which kept the whole system together. No alternative institution was set up to replace it. One of Gorbachevs failures was that whereas he destroyed the old system, he did not put a new one in its place (1998, 269). Without legitimacy it was almost impossible for the CPSU to hold the Soviet Union together, when there were strong nationalist movements in the republics, who derived legitimacy from popular support. Gorbachev attempted to give the CPSU a new basis of legitimacy in the form of electoral accountability. However the elections were a success for nationalist movements and only consolidated their position and authority shifted further from the centre to the republics. The newly elected republican legislatures claimed greater legitimacy because they were more representative and so refused to be subordinate to federal power (Walker, 1993, 179). The elections boosted the confidence of the nationalist movement and many became increasingly radical. For example, a war of laws began. Republican legislatures changed many federal policies and laws and refused to implement federal orders unless they would benefit the republic (Walker, 1993, 181). Glasnost was a key part of Gorbachevs reforms. In Russian, glasnost literally means openness and Gorbachev believed that a relaxation of censorship and oppression was needed so vital new ideas could come forward to benefit the Soviet Union. However, glasnost contributed greatly to the collapse of the Soviet Union because it unleashed nationalist forces. Firstly, this is because, people were finally shown the ills of the Soviet Union. Walker wrote the mediawhich had always painted a rosy picture of society, began to fill up with horror stories (1993, 137). Terrible stories about the actions of Lenin and Stalin were released and investigative journalists such as young televisions producer Nerzorov, revealed the dire situation the Soviet Union was currently in (McCauley, 1992, 101). Secondly, glasnost removed cultural oppression and allowed nationalist feelings that had always existed to emerge. Across the Soviet Union there was enormous cultural diversity and only a weak common identity. People were finally allowed to say that they wanted their state to be based on a cultural community and that people of the same community should rule it, which fundamentally undermined the idea of the Soviet Union ruled by the CPSU from Moscow (Sakwa, 1998, 279). People were able to organise themselves into nationalist movements and put strong collective pressure on the Soviet Union (Daniels, 1993, 125). Thirdly, the Congress of 1989 dealt a huge blow to the Soviet Union because it gave nationalist tensions an incredibly public platform. This would not have been possible before glasnost. McCauley wrote the old practice of an official line, carefully agreed speeches, and unanimous approval were gone forever (1992, 101). The arguments highlighted how fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the problems with it. The Congress was extremely significant because the Soviet public paid so much attention. Kiernan wrote the nation sat virtually hypnotised in front of its televisions as an unprecedented political spectacle was played out daily (1993, 218). Nationalism and resentment of the Soviet Union was compounded by a series of outbreaks of violence, which ended in Soviet troops killing people in the republics. Gorbachev was indirectly responsible for the killing in Baku, Tbilisi, and Vilinius. He advocated the violence but was shocked at the loss of life (McCauley, 1998, 274). These incidents could not just be swept under the carpet with glasnost. It was clear that Gorbachev had lost control in an unprecedented way for a General Secretary of the CPSU. This strengthened nationalist feeling because people started to seek a new coherent leadership and people were no longer as afraid of defying Gorbachev. This is exemplified by the Gorbachevs swing to the right in the summer of 1990 to consolidate his position (Walker, 1993, 183). Gorbachev made numerous enemies because of his reforms, or by replacing people in power, such as members of the Politburo and the Secretariat. He was continuously attacked and criticised to the point that a coup was staged in 1991 (McCauley, 1998, 92). Many of the people Gorbachev alienated also expressed their dislike by supporting nationalist movements (for example, Yeltsin). They knew that if they destabilised the Soviet Union they would weaken Gorbachevs position. There were external factors that gave rise to nationalism in the Gorbachev era. Firstly, many western states, including most importantly the USA, helped nationalist movements gain greater influence by giving them resources. For example, nationalist movements in the Baltic covertly received printing presses from the USA to enable them to mass produce their nationalist newspapers and pamphlets. Secondly, the new freedoms allowed under glasnost allowed the Soviet public to see that life was far better in the mixed economies of the West. Nationalism became more popular as people in the Soviet republics lost faith in the Union and felt that they could have a better standard of living if they were self-determined (Sakwa, 1998, 288). Finally, it is even alleged that Reagan started a new arms race with a renewed military build-up in the 1980s because he knew that the Soviet economy was weak and could collapse under the strain. This would have added to the deprivation in the republics and sti mulated nationalism (Heywood, 1997, 148). One of Gorbachevs biggest failures as Soviet leader was to almost ignore the national question. He embarked on a massive programme of economic and political reform but failed to address the significant impact this would have on the federal structure of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev failed to appease nationalist with concession and so radicalised them. Initially most nationalists called for greater freedoms, however, when Gorbachev failed to listen to their calls they moved towards wanting secession (Walker, 1993, 174-5). Nationalist movement across the republics of the Soviet Union were very different. They varied greatly in the tactics they employed and the pace at which they moved. This is demonstrated by the numerous differences between nationalists in the Baltic and Central Asia. Nationalist movements in the Baltic tended to be more radical than in Central Asia. It was Baltic nationalists that first challenged the authority of the Soviet Union with declarations of sovereignty. They were the first to discuss secession and the first to secede (Daniels, 1993, 126). Baltic nationalists were also far more protective of their ethnic identity and against, what they saw as, Russian imperialism. Daniels wrote in the extreme case, to protect their ethnic identity, the Baltic republics have tried to deny equal rights of citizenship to Russians and others who may actually have been born there and lived there all their lives (1993, 135). The radicalism in the Baltic republics is understandable in the light of the fact they were only incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (Walker, 1993, 117). In the 1980s, people in the Baltic could still remember the Soviets colluding with the Nazis and treating their nation like a commodity. This is very different to Central Asia, where many of the Soviet states had been part of a Russian-centred empire for at least one-hundred years (Daniels, 1993, 135). Central Asian republics also benefited economically from being in the Soviet Union. They tended to have weak economies and received a net inwards flow of resources as a result of being part of the Union (Walker, 1993, 180). The opposite is the case in the Baltic republics because they were some of the richest and most developed in the Soviet Union. Their bitterness at being part of the Soviet Union was compounded by the net outflow of resources (Muiznieks, 1995, 21). Nationalist movements in Central Asia did not have the ambition or the scope of those in the Baltic republics. They tended to be more concerned with local projects that directly influenced them, whereas the Baltic republics became the battleground over the fate of the Soviet Union. Muiznieks wrote nationalist movements in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania not only destroyed the structures of Soviet power in their own republics, but exported their revolutions to other areas of the Union as well (1995, 3). This is because nationalist movements in the Baltic believed that their interests would be best served by helping unleash nationalism across the Soviet Union. They also were driven by ideology to a greater extent than nationalist movements in Central Asia. The movements in the Baltic were committed to the belief that peoples should have the right to self-determination. They attempted to find allies in other Soviet republics and if they could not find some they would proactively try to cr eate some. They did this by stirring up nationalist agitation with the numerous publications and radio stations they established. Once nationalist feeling had grown, prominent activists were often sent out to help nationalist movements grow by offering practical assistance (Muiznieks, 1995, 7-8). Even if nationalist movements across the Soviet Union did not directly collude with those in the Baltic republics, there are numerous instances (for example Belorussia, Moldavia and the Ukraine) of movements importing the methods and goals of Baltic movements (Muiznieks, 1995, 11). The Baltic movements were also very influential because the Baltic was the most westernised part of the Soviet Union and managed to maintain some links with the West, and therefore contact with or emulation of the Balts might have been perceived as enhancing ones own western orientation (Muiznieks, 1995, 20). Nationalist movements in Central Asia were not as influential as those in the Baltic because they concentrated more on local disputes. They did not provide a model that was compatible with many of the republics of the Soviet Union because they were predominantly Islamic. Some animosity existed with the Christian majority across the Soviet Union. The model provided by movements in Central Asia was also much less appealing because of the violence and involvement of the Soviet military. In comparison the Baltic model was much less dangerous (Muiznieks, 1995, 20-1). In conclusion, Gorbachevs reforms, primarily perestroika and glasnost, proved to be an absolute disaster for the Soviet Union because they compounded nationalist feeling and allowed it to be expressed openly. Gorbachev crucially failed to address the national question although he had unleashed. By the time he had realised there was a serious problem, he no longer had the power to rectify the situation. Therefore, it is fair to blame Gorbachev for letting nationalism become an unstoppable force.